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A people that values its privileges above its principles soon loses both.
Dwight D. EisenhowerAs a member of a large vascular surgery group
practice in a mid-sized city, you are approached by a
woman seeking surgery for varicose veins. Her father, a
prominent state legislator, is a leading opponent of
malpractice reform in your state, one of those hardest
hit by soaring insurance premiums and the exodus of
many physicians to more hospitable parts of the coun-
try. The daughter has no public role at all. You have
been a leading proponent of legislation limiting mal-
practice tort awards. You feel very strongly, and have
publicly stated in media interviews and letters to the
editor printed in your local newspaper, that you believe
the existing tort system endangers the entire popula-
tion by destroying essential trust between physicians
and patients, driving physicians out of high-risk spe-
cialties, making medical care harder to obtain, and
causing the cost of medical care to rise astronomically.
Which of the following is your most ethical course of
action?
A. Decline to treat this particular patient to protest her
father’s political position, but provide a referral to avoid
abandonment.
B. Treat her as you would any patient, and find other ways
to express your disagreement with her father’s policies.
C. Treat the patient as you would any other. The American
Medical Association (AMA) does not recognize politi-
cal disagreements as suitable grounds for denial of care.
D. Treat the patient because failing to do so violates pro-
fessional integrity by placing your interests before hers.
E. Do not treat. Do not refer. Call your fellow surgeons and
suggest that they not treat this patient.
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doi:10.1016/j.jvs.2004.07.013The current professional liability crisis has provoked
nationwide acrimony among physicians, insurers, malprac-
tice attorneys, politicians, and those associated with the
judicial tort system. A subject once limited to disdainful
jokes has become a matter of ruined careers, bitter suspi-
cion, big money, and spirited jockeying for political advan-
tage. The discontent recently culminated in a resolution
brought before the AMA’s House of Delegates proposing
that the organization encourage doctors, “except in emer-
gencies, to refuse care to plaintiff’s attorneys and their
spouses.”1 The resolution was denounced from the floor by
physicians in attendance, and the sponsoring surgeon suc-
cumbed to pressure to withdraw the motion. A Texas-
based physicians’ Web site drew national attention earlier
this year when it named patients and their attorneys who
had initiated physician malpractice claims, with the implied
suggestion that the medical community should enforce
some justice of its own by withholding care from those
appearing on the list. The site was shut down amid shocked
public protests, but not before eliciting approving nods
from many physicians around the country who took some
secret satisfaction in the concept. The professional liability
crisis has even caused physicians who have never been sued
migrating to other states, retiring early, and wondering
how they are going to cover their malpractice premiums.
Graduating medical students are selecting specialties with
lower tort claim exposure, and established physicians are
dropping certain high-risk procedures from their available
services. It has been predicted that if the situation is not
corrected, whole communities will find themselves without
the services of neuro-, trauma, and cardiac surgeons, and
with gynecologists who don’t do obstetrics and psychia-
trists who don’t offer electroconvulsive therapy. Several
prominent carriers of medical malpractice coverage have
withdrawn from the market, some physicians have elected
to “go bare,” some medical institutions have established
funds to “self-insure,” and discussion of state-provided
coverage pools has begun. Some physicians have become
politically active to try to influence legislative relief. Unfor-
tunately, some of the most politically active have had the
worst malpractice records, and have inevitably hurt rather
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tions and perceptions of the lay public.2 Legislation limit-
ing plaintiffs’ awards has been enacted in several states, but
the bitterness between the medical and legal professions
remains unresolved. Not surprisingly, all parties in the
dispute—the physicians, the patients, the insurers, the at-
torneys, and the legislators—blames everyone but them-
selves for a problem with no easy solution on the horizon.
Political action has included individual and organiza-
tional lobbying of legislators, public protests, media ap-
pearances, “days off,” selective “strikes” (with emergency
cases covered), and denial of individual professional ser-
vices. The AMA Ethics Principle VI defends the physician’s
right, “except in emergencies, [to] be free to choose whom
to serve, with whom to associate, and the environment in
which to provide medical care.”3 Denial of treatment on
the basis of HIV seropositivity is the AMA’s sole stated
objection to the physician’s ethical entitlement to select the
patients he accepts for nonemergent treatment. There is no
evidence in the document that a physician’s personal or
sociopolitical prejudices may be considered as a basis for or
against patient exclusion.
The fourth edition of the American College of Physi-
cians’ Ethics Manual reaffirms the right to refuse nonemer-
gent care to an individual patient when treatment is other-
wise available.4 However, the manual states that “A
physician may not discriminate against a class or category of
patients.” Furthermore, politically motivated physicians are
encouraged to “find alternatives to strikes to address work-
place concerns.” Unlike individual patient refusals, strikes
deny care to undifferentiated geographic groups of pa-
tients. Nevertheless, most ethical objections to physicians’
strikes can be applied directly to a physician’s denial of care
to an individual patient. Fiester5 advances 3 compelling
objections to physician strikes: (1) they are intended to
cause harm to patients; (2) they affront the physician-
patient relationship; and (3) strikes risk diminishing the
public’s respect for the medical profession. All 3 objections
would seem to apply as well to the present case of a surgeon
refusing to treat a particular patient as an expression of a
sociopolitical position. The refusal is intended to inconve-
nience embarrass, and thereby harm the patient, it disre-
gards the special obligation of a physician to a suffering
individual, and it damages the public’s trust that physicians
will always place the needs of sick people before their own.
News of his daughter’s treatment refusal is furthermore
unlikely to inspire a more charitable attitude toward the
medical profession in the legislator who is the intended
target of the surgeon.
Declining treatment is valid and ethically necessary
when the therapy sought is unnecessary, futile, or contra-
indicated,6 when poor patient compliance will severely
limit therapeutic effectiveness,7or when another available
physician can provide better care.8 Refusing a consultation
request may also be ethically acceptable when there is a
history of personal animus or other conflict of interest that
could negatively influence the physician’s relationship withan elective patient with access to alternative care. A decision
not to treat may sometimes be justified on the basis of
individual conscience; some physicians have elected not to
perform abortions because the procedure violates their
sense of personal morality. Although our vascular surgeon
has projected the malpractice crisis as a matter of morality,
ethics, and conscience in the threat it poses to the availabil-
ity of medical care, it in fact remains a financial dispute, not
worth the more precious values of professional integrity
and physician responsibility. The depth of the surgeon’s
passion does not confer ethical authorization upon uneth-
ical action.
Rejecting a patient with an urgent need for care and
attempting to deprive her of treatment elsewhere within
the profession would be heinous under any circumstance,
least of all as a symbolic human sacrifice to a political
disagreement. Option E is ethically unacceptable, repre-
senting a fit of pique and not the exercise of professional or
individual conscience. Refusing to treat this patient further-
more violates the professional virtue of self-effacement,
which obligates the surgeon to set aside factors like race,
religion, gender, sexual orientation, or accidents of birth
that are irrelevant to the care of the patient.10 Indeed,
refusal to treat this patient is vicious, not virtuous. Glick11
calls deliberate deprivation of “a third and innocent party 
in order to apply pressure on someone else  a bizarre ethic
indeed,” because it treats the patient only as a means to an
end that cannot be supported by appeals to either profes-
sional or individual conscience. When we encounter varia-
tions on this sort of behavior in the daily news we call it
“terrorism.”
Although this patient has ready access to other vascular
surgeons, including those in your own group, Option A is
not defensible, because the right to refuse treatment as-
sumes that its exercise will not violate professional integrity,
a condition that cannot be satisfied in this case. Options B
and C are both reasonable, but do not directly confront the
ethical issue posed by this case. Parenthetically, and as
noted, the AMA does not expressly prohibit denial of
service on political grounds. Option D does approach the
problem on ethical grounds, and should therefore guide
the surgeon’s action and our estimation of how he manages
conflicts between his ethical and his sociopolitical interests.
The practice of medicine has been characterized by
difficult and seemingly unsolvable problems throughout
the ages. The kinds of men and women who become
physicians, and surgeons in particular, are invariably activ-
ists by nature, people who regularly and aggressively con-
front and solve even the most tenacious problems. To do so
durably and effectively, however, our methods must remain
consistent with the ideals that underpin all that we do to
relieve human suffering. If we are to maintain the special
social relationship that enables so much of what we do, the
suffering of our patients must never be accepted as the
proper battleground upon which to act out our displeasure
with poorly-conceived public policies.
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